A ritual slaughter

An act with consequences

Incorrigible agitator Theo van Gogh was not a univocal man. Neither an angel nor a devil, but both at the same time. A man with many friends, but with far more enemies. His furore as ‘enfant terrible’, as agitator and pain in the neck was greater than his reputation as talented filmmaker. His creative cinematic eye was —for many people— overshadowed by his monomaniac fulminating mouth. His coarse contact with friend and enemy was rewarded with scorn, appreciation, and undesired death. “I will do my utmost to insult a lot of people deeply. You can get the whole Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Hyde story from me” [Theo van Gogh, Volkskrant 3.11.2004].

On 2 November 2004 filmmaker and critic Theo van Gogh was brutally murdered in Amsterdam, by a young man of Moroccan descent, who had been born in the Netherlands. He committed his crime in the name of a radical islamic ideal of a theocratic state, governed by Allah. It was a far-reaching event in many ways. Many Dutch people couldn’t help feeling that a kind of fifth column was operating, trying to violently force their backward radical islamic ideas on those that displeased him. Apparently there were subversive powers in the underbelly of the Dutch society, who did not care a fig for the basic principles of a democratic constitutional state, because to them Allah’s word was the highest commandment.

This is why ‘allochthonous’ fellow compatriots rightly feared the worst: if a political murder is committed in the name of their worshipped Allah, they could all end up deeper in the black books, where they didn’t feel quite at ease anyway. And, as we shall see, this was what happened. The once so tolerant Dutch nation was shocked, got overheated and was in danger of heading for a national disaster. Back and forth the knives were being sharpened. Lines were drawn in the sand.

The murder of Theo van Gogh led to strongly emotional and contradictory reactions. The dominant tone was one of emotional disgust and muscular condemnation. These emotions were founded on fundamentally democratic grounds: political and/or religious differences of opinion should be solved with non-violent means in a democratic constitutional state. At the same time there was a growing awareness that democratic norms and institutions should be defended: freedom has to protect itself.

Politicians of the established parties tumbled over each other in condemning this religiously inspired political murder. The cabinet immediately announced that it would fight the battle against muslim extremism the hard way and by making use of emergency legislation. The intelligence and security services would have to be expanded as soon as possible, ‘regardless of the expenses’. Civilians, who are seriously threatened on account of their opinions, should have a claim to personal security from then on. Adapting the legislation should enable the removal of terrorists from the Netherlands, after serving their sentence here. Muscular language, used to convince civilians that the government still was a reliable guarantee for the safety of all its subjects.

Liberals doing the splits In the party political skirmishes in the Hague the liberal party (VVD) was confronted with three extremely difficult problems. First of all, the VVD had to protect itself and her members (to begin with Hirsi Ali) against terrorist violent threats. Secondly, it had to do everything to take the political wind out of the sails of the renegade Geert Wilders. And thirdly, its own weak minister of the Interior, Remkes, was subjected to heavy criticism, being the first in charge for the performance of the AIVD, the Dutch intelligence service. The tragic nature of this situation was even enhanced by opinion polls. In these polls Wilders gained 20 and even nearly 30 seats. This gain was caused —according to Maurice de Hond— mainly by the LPF (which dropped from 8 to 0 seats). At least 70 percent of the LPF-voters said they would vote for Group Wilders now. Of the seats moving to Group Wilders 7 are from the VVD, 5 from the LPF, 5 from the CDA and 3 from the left-wing parties. The VVD dropped in the polls from 27 to 16 seats. More than half of the voters were in favour of new elections for the Lower Chamber. This was not surprising. The PvdA (Labour Party) rose from 42 to 56 seats and the SP (Socialist Party) from 8 to 13 seats (and the Christian Union from 3 to 5). Half of the voters chose Wouter Bos (leader of the Labour Party) as prime minister, and only 39 the present prime minister Balkenende.

On behalf of the cabinet vice-premier Gerrit Zalm (VVD) issued an official declaration of war.

“It appears there is a movement active in the Netherlands, which justifies murder based on religious motives. We haven’t experienced this since the seventeenth century. This should be eradicated root and branch. The cabinet declares war to extremists.”

The metaphor of the ‘war against terrorism’ was adopted straight from the American president Bush. This ‘Bushian’ macho-talk is at best a poor metaphor for a fierce and difficult to solve political and social conflict. Such use of language only enhances the gap between muslims and non-muslims and suggests that anything is allowed in this conflict. They exactly play the islamic extremists’ game by giving them what they want: a holy war. In times of emergency a nation needs mediators, not demolitionists. Prime minister Balkenende had a better understanding and modified the declaration of war of his vice-premier. “It is the fight against terrorism that counts,” Balkenende said, and ‘war’ should be read as ‘fight’. The prime minister emphasised that “we have to continue the dialogue” and “we have to hold on to each other.”

“Holland has always been a tolerant country. The atmosphere of violence that is now prevalent is dreadful. The situation should be checked. Those who overindulge in extremism and radicalism will be watched. But we also need a dialogue. It should not be us against them. We must not forget that most followers of islam in the Netherlands are peaceful people.”

A heated discussion has burst forth, spreading passionate emotions and also a lot of ‘non-correct’ opinions through the media. Especially via internet many extremist opinions on islam, the immigrants and asylum seekers have been voice. On the one side we can see the populist, neo-nationalist and neo-fascist political movements and organisations. Orphaned fortuynism (the populist movement that gathered around Pim Fortuyn) tried to gain control over the ‘gut feelings’.

On the other side we see more or less deeply religious followers of islam and of traditional Arabic cultures and customs that are rather ‘strange’ to a lot of Dutch people, and often ‘not of this time’ either. Followers of islam have withdrawn in their own religious perception as a last source of their own identity. They have been torn to pieces between contradictory cultures and anxiously try to keep their heads up. By intensive internalisation of the islamic morals, there is no more room for ecumenical dialogue, let alone for discussions with disbelievers, or with democrats who wish to keep church and state strictly separate. Radical islamites consider dissidents and disbelievers to be objects who, if need be with force, have to be called to Allah’s order.

This was exactly the idea that induced Mohammed B. to liquidate Theo van Gogh. His faith in Allah was deeply offended by the, in his perception, blasphemous statements of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh. They called his Allah a cruel god, his prophets were depicted as pimps, perverts and hypocrites, and believers were dismissed as ‘goat fuckers’. To Mohammed B. this was an unbearable thought, a feeling impossible to live with. He decided to perform an act. An act he was prepared to sacrifice his own life for. He longed for a martyr’s death. His friends and fellow believers supported him in his willingness to be killed in action. He was prepared to bring the highest sacrifice. But then of course in exchange for the blessings of the hereafter, which each islamic fanatic expects from his martyrdom. However, things would go differently than planned.

The perpetrator survived his foretold murder of the famous filmmaker and criticaster. In spite of the fierce volleys of shots aimed at the arresting police officers, he was brought down in a professional way by a shot to his leg. Mohammed B. succeeded in killing Theo van Gogh, but he failed as a martyr. And he did the followers of islam in Holland a bad turn. He confined nearly all his fellow believers to a state of great distress and fear.

The murder committed by Mohammed B. was preceded by a process of radicalisation, which he documented on internet, together with his friends from the so-named Hofstadgroup. On the basis of these documents we can reconstruct with fair precision why Mohammed B. will be remembered in our national history as a political murderer (next to Balthasar G., the murderer of William I of Orange on 10 July 1584, and Volkert van der G., the murderer of Pim Fortuyn on 6 May 2002).

Internet is pre-eminently a place where people can express their opinion plainly and discuss anonymously.

The rise of populist fortuynism in the Netherlands went hand in hand with a strong hardening of the political debate and a coarsening in the style of discussion. It was difficult not to notice that many people who make use of the internet contributed to this polarised hardening. Many discussion forums have degenerated into refuges for people who deeply insult and slander each other, and even threaten each other with death. Democrats worry about the radical elements that weave networks of hatred. These networks make use of encrypted messages, the content of which remains hidden from police and judicial authorities.

Using modern communication media is an essential part of extreme nationalist and islamist strategies. Both the (autochthonous) right-extremist and the (allochthonous) militant islamic traffic have strongly increased on the internet in recent years. Internet also allows fairly small and relatively poor extremist political movements to make use of very powerful propaganda and recruiting instruments. Compared to other means of propaganda (such as pamphlets, brochures, newspapers, magazines, radio, television) internet is very cheap and at the same time offers the possibility to reach a huge number of people. This applies in particular to youngsters who are difficult to reach via the traditional media. All parts of internet are used by nationalist and religious extremists: they publish websites, transfer files, exchange messages via e-mail, discuss in web forums and news groups, and talk to each other via chat, instant messaging or video-conferencing. Websites containing criminally prohibited material are often moved abroad. In the United States racism, anti-semitism and other discriminating statements fall within the constitutional right of freedom of speech. But many of these websites in fact operate on servers that are located on Dutch territory and are maintained by Dutch citizens.

The internet is a free state and refuge for awkward opinions. Theo van Gogh had learned – just like his killer – how to make use of it. As a columnist he had been dumped by many newspapers and magazines, on account of his extraordinarily insulting texts. “As a writer of small pieces I was sent away everywhere or fired or censored so much that it seemed to be better to take the honourable way out” [Van Gogh]. As a reaction he opened his own site De Gezonde Roker [The Healthy Smoker], in which he took every liberty to ventilate his venom on events and persons. He didn’t do this anonymously, however, but by name. He wrote in personal capacity, showed his face and had a clear identity. Theo van Gogh understood very well that he didn’t write for a locally restricted or small public, but had a fairly large range. He didn’t utter personal opinions that died away in the air they put in motion. Now, after his death, his opinions are still on internet and can be read there.

Theo van Gogh considered the internet to be the only medium on which he could speak freely. His website contained columns from the Metro [newspaper], but other texts as well that wouldn’t make the printed media without censorship.

The internet differs from everyday conversations situations in three ways. The identity of the author is usually unknown, a potentially world wide public is reached and uttered opinions are saved and can be read again later on.

Computer mediated interactions have a disinhibiting effect. People who communicate via internet feel less inhibited [Reid 1994; Benschop 1998]. They feel free to say or ask what they have always wanted to say or ask. Internet offers us a chance to communicate anonymously with each other. To a great extent we can determine how we present ourselves or which role we would like to play. On the internet we are who we pretend to be.

A cry for attention In local life people are forced to show consideration for others and to come up to ‘normal’ expectations. Internet forums are free states with little social control. Participants who voice extreme opinions cry for attention. If they don’t get it they are tempted to express themselves in an ever more extreme way. Forums incapable of regulating themselves are threatened to be undermined by this. They go down in an uncontrollable jumble of inflated, resentful ‘muscular language’. The risks become even larger when the bound between virtual and local statements fades away.

In this way the traditional local mechanisms of social control are eliminated: on the internet we quite often don’t know for sure with whom we are communicating at a certain moment. Apart from a lot of disadvantages it has the advantage of feeling freer to express oneself in a disinhibited way. The most intimate and ultimate outpourings are the order of the day on internet. Communications via internet do not have immediate repercussions on the local social life of the individual participants. Thus they feel free(r) to express themselves in a disinhibited way. This is precisely the reason why internet communications are characterised by two extreme manifestations of social behaviour: being excessively and unwontedly sweet to other people (‘netslutting’ or ‘flirting’) and excessively insulting or even threatening people (‘netshitting” or ‘flaming’).

On the internet people easily fall in love with the (partial and often distorted) self-made image that other people present of themselves and this image can be further romanticised to taste. However, at the same time we notice that discussants are more quickly inclined to react to contributions that don’t please them with personal insults and threats. We are also talking about a form of stalking women here. They are stalked online with sexual harassment and perversities, quite often with drastic local repercussions. This is not a matter of ‘love’ (a more or less mistaken feeling of affection or desire), but a matter of ‘hatred’ (a more or less generalised feeling of disapproval or disgust).

Anonymous internet communication lowers the threshold to criticise dissidents in a frank and emotional way. Besides, being a global and accessible medium, internet has a great capacity to unify distributed discontent to a political opinion or even organised movement. In the more innocent initial phase of the internet many discussions on ‘flaming’ took place in discussion forums of Usenet. This molecular netshitting was often accompanied by spiteful generalisations about people with certain nationalities, ethnicities, skin colours, and religious or sexual preferences. In discussion forums this everyday netshitting frequently ended in full-blown virtual wars: ‘flame wars’.

That is the reason why in many discussion forums standards were established right from the start to prevent this kind of morbid growth. This netiquette particularly took aim against stalking women by using undesired sexual advances, against insulting or threatening persons and against discriminatory statements. By appealing to this netiquette insults and threats that got out of hand were usually appeased by the forum visitors together. The threat of ‘asocialisation’ of online interactions has been averted in most discussion forums by a virtual form of socialisation. Yet, this self-regulation hasn’t become common property yet.

As is the case in any other community or network standards and protective mechanisms have to de developed, preventing this community from going down by uncontrollable and destructive powers. It is not only a matter of protection here against people who take a delight in disrupting and consciously frustrating a virtual community of people. It is also about the sum of netshitting and vandalising elements that jointly cannot only destroy the atmosphere, but also the community or the network itself. This is extensively analysed in the description of the network theory.

How can we prevent discussion forums from becoming muddy by anonymous dirt from hate hooligans? An effort has been made by introducing a registration and identification obligation. However, it is relatively easy for people to adopt another identity on the internet. A pseudonym and non-traceable e-mail address are easily found. That was why the chief editors of the newspaper Algemeen Dagblad were eventually compelled to close the discussion forum completely. What remained was the flimsy announcement: “AD.nl/Mening has been closed due to continuing abuse.” The guestbook of the NRC Handelsblad had been shut down before for similar reasons. Forum administrators themselves should guard the bounds of what is admissible and intervene when those bounds are exceeded by crude personal insults or threats. Anyone who wants to confine forum vandalism will have to set up strict social conventions and consistently remove contributions that are out of bounds.

A citizen of Amsterdam has been slaughtered

“Don’t do it, don’t do it”, he cried out.

Profile of a political murderer
On 6 May 2002 Pim Fortuyn was murdered by a radical white environmental activist. On 2 November 2004 Theo van Gogh was slaughtered in a gruesome way by a young man of Moroccan descent. Mohammed B. is a 26 year-old man, born and raised in the Netherlands. He was born on 8 March 1978 in Amsterdam-East. When he was seven the family moved to a bigger flat in the Overtoomse Veld in Amsterdam-West. Mohammed grew up in the Hart Nibbrigstraat, where his father still lives. He visited the elementary school on the August Allebéplein. He played soccer (not so well) and reluctantly followed koran lessons in the small mosque in the Jan Voermanstraat. He didn’t have many contacts and was very shy with girls.

Family B. Mohammed’s father Hamid was born in 1942 in Douar Ikhammalen, a poor Berber village in the Rif Mountains, where maize and olives are cultivated. He was the youngest of seven brothers. When his father died in 1944 the whole family was driven in financial distress. The children were starving. As a young boy Hamid tends sheep and works the land. At the beginning of the sixties he left for Paris, together with two other brothers, Abdurrahman and Abdelkadit, to work at the expansion of the metro network. In 1965 he came to Holland to work as a dishwasher at Schiphol Airport.     In 1967 Hamid returns to the Rif Mountains to marry Habiba Amyay, a woman his mother selected for him. When he saw Habiba for the first time, he immediately found her attractive. For years Hamid goes to Morocco each summer to visit his wife. Their eldest daughter Saïda was born there in 1977. Shortly afterwards the family settled in Amsterdam-East. There the eldest son Mohammed was born on 8 March 1978, to be followed by five daughters and a son. The youngest daughter Samira was born in 1987.     Mohammed’s father works very hard, makes long days and does the shopping for the whole week during the weekends. There was little time left for his children. They were raised by Habiba [NRC 9.7.05].

Mohammed B. was raised in a dreary, ghetto-like area ‘at the wrong side of the motorway’. Due to the high concentration of immigrants the area Overtoomse Veld is also popularly called ‘saucer city’ (due to the large number of satellite dishes used for watching broadcasts in Arabic). Mohammed was so successful at school that he —contrary to most of his peers— could attend higher general secondary education in 1990. He goes to the Mondriaan College, a few hundred metres away from his parental home. He didn’t distinguish himself from other pupils and was rather withdrawn. His teachers had a fairly positive picture of Mohammed. He was timid, attentive and career-minded.

In 1995 Mohammed received his diploma. His teachers and fellow pupils considered Mohammed to be a pleasant, straightforward pupil His history teacher, who was eager to hand him his certificate, regarded him as one of the ‘bright boys’ who would ‘probably succeed’.

Frustration didn’t come until later. In his area the life of many 'allochthonous' youngsters mainly takes place on the streets. Compared to the trouble-causing loitering youngsters Mohammed behaved “very obediently, as an example to his peers” [youth worker R. Heines]. He tried to show those youngsters that there were other ways to live. Since they live in Dutch society they should achieve in that society as well.

Nearly security guard at Schiphol Airport In November 1997 Mohammed was in trouble with the police for the first time. In a coffee-shop in Amsterdam he came to blows with policemen. He swore and threatened them. He was sentenced to a fine of five hundred guilders. When he applied for the position of security guard at Schiphol, he believed he had no criminal record. He thought he had already been appointed by the security company Group 4 Securitas in Rijswijk. They had already given him a uniform, his entrance permit for the airport was ready, and he had already started an internal training. But then the police force Haaglanden issued a negative advice over his appointment. Mohammed engaged a lawyer to raise a strong protest against it. He thought his criminal record was an error. The police stated that “other known and relevant facts” were also the reason for their advice.

In the youth centre De Oostoever he stood out. He showed leadership, was intelligent and was characterised by the former chairman of Eigenwijks, Wim Knol, as “a born leader.” He knew how to hold on to Moroccan youngsters and to keep them off the streets. In 1994 he suffered his first major misfortune. The youth centre was demolished. The district council didn’t replace it with a new youth centre, but by a migrant centre instead, where their parents could also go. That touched on a sore spot with the Moroccan youngsters. After all, it was precisely the rigid parental control that they wanted to avoid. Besides, the centre was much too tidy with far too many restrictive rules. Together with his youngsters Mohammed ended up on the streets again. He felt conned and not taken seriously.

Something was brewing among the ethnic community in the area. In April 1998 the fat was in the fire. There were riots on and around the loitering-place on the August Allebéplein. Hundreds of – mainly Moroccan – youngsters turned against the police [Fogteloo/ Pellekaan 2003]. According to Mohammed the local authorities had left the youngsters out in the cold and the riots were the direct consequence of this.

At that time Mohammed was not a practising muslim. During the ramadan he fasted, but he didn’t go to the mosque every Friday afternoon. Mohammed was fond of beer and used soft drugs. When he was stoned he told his friends the most fantastic stories. His first relationship was with a modern Tunisian-Dutch girl, and lasted for three months. Mohammed wanted to live on his own and in 1999 he rented a house in the Marianne Philipsstraat.

Mohammed wanted to become an accountant. Together with his friend and next-door neighbour Mohammed Bouker, he decided to study accounting at the InHolland College in Diemen. But unlike his friend, this study didn’t come easily to him. He switched to business informatics. He received a student grant and earned an additional income doing administrative work. In 2002 he changed studies again. But after a study in social-pedagogical assistance of three months, he quit school once and for all. Five years of study gone and no degree whatsoever. But Mohammed had other things on his mind.

Step by step he began to develop more fanatical and aggressive behaviour. This wasn’t unnoticed by his fellow students. For a while Mohamed Taimounti studied at the same college as Mohammed:

“He came, did his homework and that was it. Some of my friends had slightly more contact with him, but once in a while there were conflicts. At school, for instance, he addressed young muslims who drank alcohol. He got very angry and said: ‘If you drink alcohol once more, you really have a problem with me.’ This doesn’t have to mean that he really threatens with violence, but it sure was unpleasant. He didn’t seem to have any real friends at school, especially not in the end. He withdrew, together with those other people that are locked up now” [Trouw 9.7.05].

In the meantime Mohammed remained involved in the problems in his own neighbourhood. He continued pleading for their own youth centre and had discussions about it with the district council. He talked and tried to convince, but got stuck on the evasiveness of a passive bureaucracy. Mohammed’s ambitions were blocked, he became frustrated and angry. The ‘white world’ didn’t take him seriously, he felt betrayed and let down. His suppressed anger started transforming into aggression. This led to several confrontations with the police.

In the spring of 2000 Mohammed discovered that his sister was having a secret affair with Abdu A., a Moroccan boy who was a member of ‘The Daltons‘, a gang of seven brothers who frequently came into contact with the police. Mohammed thought his sister was behaving like a whore and had defiled his family’s honour. His father Hamid was in his opinion much too lax. He said: “I’ve spoken with her, but she won’t listen to me. What more can I do?” As the eldest son he felt responsible for the life his family leads. And he took this task very seriously. He took his sister prisoner: he locked her up and prevented her from leaving the parental home. In a moment he wasn’t paying attention she succeeded in calling the police. Two local policemen visited the family and tried to mediate. The matter blew over after the boyfriend in question —on the initiative of the police— officially introduced himself to the family [KRO-reporter]. The family honour had been saved.

In the summer of 2000 he had another confrontation with the police. Barely 22 years old, he was involved in a pub brawl in Diemen. On 21 July he and his friends besieged the student bar De Kooi. He punched another visitor hard in the face, and was left with a broken ankle himself. In the spring of 2001 another incident took place. On the Leidseplein in Amsterdam he came to blows with Abdu A., the Moroccan boy who had had an affair with his sister. When he met this boy in the Vondelpark again, things got out of hand. Fuming with rage he pulled a knife (his friends say he took it away from Abdu A.). Mohammed was overpowered by police officers and removed to prison. In October he was convicted for abuse and threatening and ended up in a cell for 12 weeks. In prison religion started to become important for Mohammed. In his cell he began to study the koran.

When Mohammed was released in September 2001, he was confronted with more problems at home. Due to serious back troubles his father was declared disabled and at the end of 2001 his mother, Habiba Amyay, died of breast cancer. She was buried in Oujda, a Moroccan city near the Algerian border, where his father had bought a second house in the mid eighties. A year later his father returned to Morocco to marry Fatima, Habiba’s younger sister.

On 11 September 2001 the Twin Towers and the Pentagon are attacked in the USA by a terrorist cell of al-Qaeda. His first reaction was that violence was not a solution to anything. He didn’t agree with the American policy, but he said he rejected this kind of violent action. Yet, a few days later he told his friend that according to him the jews were behind the attack.

Nevertheless Mohammed once again dedicated himself to the youngsters in the area in the beginning of 2002. He was the leader of the self-organisation of Moroccan youngsters, phrases their feelings and desires, writes columns in the neighbourhood newsletter and starts a computer club for young people. In February 2002 he organised a political café in community centre Eigenwijks. With this he earned status within the group. Time and again he emphasised that there are not enough local facilities for the youngsters in the neighbourhood, and therefore they just hung around and caused trouble. They needed a youth centre of their own.

Even so, he didn’t succeed in getting a new youth centre going. The district council did want to talk to him, but he only got vague promises. With the support of the neighbourhood association Eigenwijks Mohammed and two of his friends drew up a solid plan for a new youth centre in a few months. The plan was named Mondriaans Doenia, the World of Mondriaan. The request for subsidy was sent to The Hague, but at the ministry it ended up in the wastepaper basket. For Mohammed this was the last drop that made the cup run over. First they took his youth centre away from him, then they made promises they did not keep, and subsequently a carefully and painstakingly drawn up request for subsidy for a real youth centre was denounced with one stroke of the official pen. In December 2002 Mohammed had another meeting at the ministry, together with the coordinator of Eigenwijks, Dirk Glastra van Loon. Mohammed explained his plans. But he exploded when afterwards a female policy official asked him how he knew his plan would work. He threw his arms in the air and yelled: “Are we so clever or you so stupid?”

Mohammed B. in 2003

Mohammed was deeply disappointed: years of hard work done, but no result whatsoever. He quit college and went on social security. His criminal record of violent crimes was no recommendation for a good job. Mohammed began to resort to islam. In a room in the neighbourhood association Eigenwijks he searched for islamic texts on internet that appealed to him. He was completely absorbed in this quest for appealing islamic texts and intended to start a website of his own. Mohammed became more and more ‘fundamentalist’. This also showed in his appearance. He grew a beard and walked around in islamic clothes. He lost his joviality and openness. Mohammed grew cold.

In spite of his ever-increasing radical islamic ideas and behaviour, Eigenwijks appointed Mohammed manager of a large room. He seemed to have a good attitude for this. He was helpful, always available and could be reached day and night. But the problems soon started. On religious grounds Mohammed objected to serving alcohol in the room. Furthermore, he objected to mixed use of the room: according to him men and women had to be separated. In spite of all attempts to reach a compromise, he stood his ground. He was beyond reasoning. Mohammed’s demands were unacceptable to the management of the centre and his contract was ended.

From now on Mohammed had all the time in the world to gain more in-depth knowledge of islam. He locked himself up in his house and sat behind his computer for hours on end. He read radical islamic texts, translated them, wrote articles and distributed them via internet under a pseudonym. Mohammed revealed himself as a modern teleworking terrorist, a ‘tele-terrorist’.

In the district council Mohammed B.’s radicalisation grew into a source of concern. The police were informed, and they in their turn informed the AIVD. Mohammed B. had, however, been under the eyes of the AIVD earlier due to the articles he wrote for the neighbourhood newspaper Over ’t Veld. In this newspaper Mohammed began to disseminate his newly acquired islamic insights.

Values and norms, islam and integration according to Mohammed B. For the AIVD Mohammed B. comes in the picture on 1 August 2002, with his article on Normen en waarden (Values and norms). In this article and based on quotations from the koran he tries to show that it is not a good thing to hang around in the streets and that one should take to heart the complaints of those who are bothered by it. “But unfortunately not everyone has this sense of responsibility and they are precisely the ones who cause these excesses.” In Mijn maatschappelijke invulling (My social interpretation) he explains how he will put this into practice. The Workgroup Youngsters in which he participates gets “the eternal reproach” that they do not include allochthonous women in their activities. He calls it an arrogant reproach and points out that the workgroup is no professional social institution. Women are not excluded according to him, but addressed “in an appropriate way”, proceeding from his own islamic conviction. By that time he has stopped shaking hands with women. In Jihad in Amsterdam West [28.11.02] he shows how strongly his neighbourhood activities are inspired by islam. His report on the activities of the Workgroup Youngsters is prefaced by and peppered with koran quotations and religious pieties. He pleads for a peaceful jihad against the negative imago of the neighbourhood. In Islam en integratie [13.2.03] (Islam and integration) Mohammed B. provides us with a very personal interpretation of the concept of integration. He looked up the meaning of the word in the Prisma-dictionary: to be included in a larger whole. According to him this explains “the whole Islamic concept of submission (body and ghost) to that Sole Power who is the creator of the larger whole we call the universe and of which the human being is part.” With a female member of the editorial staff of Over ’t Veld Mohammed argues about her interpretation of some verses of the koran. He doesn’t approve of her interpretation. He says: “I am right and you aren’t, because I’m a man and you are a woman”. Upon that the woman resigns from the editorial staff immediately. Mohammed has found his vocation and lets everybody know: “I’m going to follow the prophet.” He alienates from his family and most of his old friends. They are replaced by many new radical islamic ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’.

Mohammed not only alienated from his own family and friends, but also from the leaders of his local religious community. As a little boy he was taught the koran by imam Ahmed at the local Al-Oumma mosque on the Postjesweg. In the summer of 2003 Mohammed had become so radicalised that he even rejected the most prototypical orthodox Al Tawheed mosque as being too liberal. When he met imam Ahmed he said: “I’ve come to tell you what the real islam is.”

By then Mohammed is strongly convinced that he holds a lease of the truth. He had suddenly seen the light and the truth of islam. “You don’t tell the truth”, he said to the imam. Mohammed tried to explain to the imam that the manner in which Allah has arranged his law cannot be changed and that one cannot be a true muslim without strictly obeying these divine laws. The imam was baffled by the haughtiness of ‘this little boy‘. In his weekly Friday prayer the imam referred to his absurd confrontation with a little boy that came to haul him over the coals.

The AIVD also knows that in his home in the Marianne Philipsstraat living-room meetings were organised of radical re-islamised youngsters and that he accommodated one of the leaders of this ‘Hofstadgroup’: Nouredine El-F. More and more Mohammed disappeared from sight. His jeans were replaced by a djellaba and he prayed five times a day. He visited the controversial El Tawheed mosque where he met kindred spirits and made contact with men from Egypt, Algeria and Syria, who gave special courses and lectures. Together with Nouredine El F. Mohammed attended a lecture of the Syrian preacher Radwan al Issa —alias Abu Khaled— in a phone centre in Schiedam. They invited the charismatic Syrian to give some lectures in Mohammed’s house in Amsterdam. There the aspirant members of the Hofstadgroup met to have themselves prepared for the jihad by Radwan al Issa.

“I will kill you” In May 2004 Mohammed B. had a fight with a security guard of the Social Service and snapped at him “I will kill you” and “I will tear your heart out.” On 29 September 2004 he ended up in prison again, because he went berserk when he was fined for fare-dodging in the tram. He refused to shake hands with a police officer during the interrogation. The officer asked him to explain his bad behaviour. He spat on the ground and cried out: “I hate you, I hate you.” At his arrest Mohammed was carrying a bag full of papers. The police copied these documents and sent them to the intelligence service (AIVD). They were hand-written texts on islam, lists with phone numbers and two inventories of personal belongings. At the end of the book-list he wrote: “With the other books you can do what you like.” Soon both documents would be recovered as attachments to his testament.

In spite of all these alarming signals the police and intelligence services misjudged the danger of Mohammed B. He was known to the police for criminal offences. Between 1997 and September 2004 he was in trouble with the police five times. He specifically offered resistance to police officers: he insulted, kicked and hit them.

He was also known by the AIVD (Dutch Secret Service). But he was not on the list of 150 persons who were followed by the service very closely. The AIVD had no indications that Mohammed B. prepared violent actions. “There were no indications that he was a risk”, said home secretary Remkes during the parliamentary debate on the murder. Mohammed B. was in the company of the group of extremist muslims who had attracted the AIVD’s attention, but was not believed to belong to the vital group. In the eyes of the AIVD he only played a minor role in the inquiry into other persons, for instance Samir Azzouz, who was arrested for the second time in the summer of 2004, on suspicion of preparing a terrorist attack.

In December 2002 Mohammed had radicalised so completely that he suggested “that a bomb attack should be carried out, leading to many deaths” [Nouredine el F. in ambtsbericht AIVD]. He embraced the appeal for a holy war, the islamic jihad. Police, judicial authorities and intelligence services completely underestimated the violent potential of Mohammed B. This turned out to be a fatal error.

The last supper On Monday evening 1 November 2004 the martyr/murderer-to-be receives some friends at his home. It is ramadan and Mohammed knows for certain that this will be the last evening of his life. He gets a visit from Jason W. and Ismail A., who are both arrested on 10 November 2004, after a siege of the Antheunisstraat in The Hague. They bring him some soup (statement of Fahmi B.). Together they have a late supper and they reminisce about the good old days when they still smoked and drank. They laugh a lot during this last supper. After midnight Mohammed takes a short walk around the Sloterplas, a lake in his neighbourhood, together with Rachid B. and Ahmed H. They use an mp3 player to listen to texts from the koran. They don’t speak a lot. Mohammed points at the sky with admiration. It is a beautiful and quiet sky. His friends also look up, but they don’t say a word. When they return home by two o’clock Mohammed and Ahmed go straight to bed. They get up at half past five to eat and say their morning prayer. Then Ahmed goes to bed again. Mohammed leaves the house. He has an appointment with death.

The self-appointed martyr took his assignment seriously. Theo van Gogh was brutally slaughtered in broad daylight. First he was shot at (“at least twenty shots, aimed carefully”), then the gun was calmly reloaded with a new magazine. And then the victim was violently stabbed: “at least 10 times”, “full of hate”, “as if he tried to stab a car tyre”. He cuts Theo’s throat. He takes a second knife and a piece of paper from his rucksack. Writes a short text, folds it, and sticks the kitchen knife and message into the victim’s chest.

The text was an incitement to the islamic holy war. He himself carried a farewell letter: Drenched in blood (In bloed gedoopt). What many people feared turned out to be true: the murderer had acted out of radical islamic conviction. Theo van Gogh became the first victim of the islamic jihad in the Netherlands.

During the interrogations by the police and his trial in front of the judge the murderer referred to his right to remain silent. That was his right. But here we try to make him speak, and to listen to him.

Where did things go wrong for this gentle, intelligent and helpful Mohammed B.? What were the key experiences that made him go off the rails? Into which walls did he run? How can somebody who tried to adapt so much to the Dutch culture eventually commit a murder with a terrorist intent? What possessed him not only to want to destroy Theo van Gogh’s life, but also his own? Who else were informed of his murder plans?

Flower memorial to Theo van Gogh, on the spot where he was murdered.

A citizen of Amsterdam had been murdered. The first reactions on the internet concentrated on the books of condolence. In these books people expressed angry emotions of sympathy. Many made use of this opportunity to present their own radical solutions. On Condoleance.nl Danier wishes the family and friends of Van Gogh a lot of courage. But he immediately added:

“To those who don’t respect freedom of speech I would like to stay: PISS OFF AND GET OUT OF THIS COUNTRY!!! You have come here to enjoy democracy, haven’t you? Then learn to deal with it. Some of you may have been brought here by your parents or grandparents, but you are free to go, so go if you don’t feel at home here!”

Some people drew historic parallels. “First Pim, now Theo, who’s next?” [Michael]. Others emphasised the unique features of the situation. It was the first time the Dutch were practically confronted with internationally organised islamic terrorism. What had we done to deserve this?

Did Van Gogh have to die because he considered islam to be a backward culture, because he called muslims “goat fuckers” and the leader of the Belgian Arabic European League (AEL), Abou Jahjah (“the Belgian advocate of the true religion”) a “pimp of the Prophet”? Just like Ayaan Hirsi Ali he regarded the prophet Mohammed as a “perverse tyrant”. Of course Theo was pushing things too far when he forced them into the wrong corner by calling them “the religious fascists of Islam” [21.12.03]. This doesn’t only show banality, but also bad taste. On the other hand: Theo passionately wanted to say what he thought. “Violence should not be provoked by acting frightened” [Van Gogh]. Theo wanted to say what he thought. His “bald highness” (Pim Fortuyn) became his idol. The fact that freedom of speech is always restricted by rules of decency and fairness annoyed him tremendously. He simply always wanted to say what he thought, without taking responsibility for the consequences of his own actions.

He learned to understand the power of the published word. ‘Kutmarokkanen’ (cunt-Moroccans) was the word that stuck to the Amsterdam alderman Rob Oudkerk. ‘Geitenneukers’ (goat fuckers) will be indissolubly connected with the testament of Theo van Gogh. One can think of better qualifications to be remembered by as a human being. With Van Gogh it was frequently only a foolish form of playing the tough guy. “Sometimes it can be appropriate, but when often used it loses each provocative meaning” [Karin Spaink].

Theo van Gogh took up controversial viewpoints to just about anything: about the multicultural society and the position of women in islam, and of course about muslims. But he also had his own disqualifications for magistrates, wearers of headscarves, gays and the Netherlands.

• Job Cohen, generally considered to be a very competent and sympathetic mayor of Amsterdam, was written off by Theo as follows: “Of all con-men, trying to sell us this fifth column of goat fuckers as an enrichment of our so-called great multicultural society, Job Cohen is the most cunning one. He is indeed on his way to become famous amongst Allah’s butchers: as a jew you can send for a message.”
• Paul Rosenmöller, ex-chairman of GroenLinks (left-wing political party) was written off as follows: “If anyone deserves cancer, it is Paul Rosenmöller, scoutmaster of politically correct Holland. May the cells in his head shape into a jubilant tumour. Let us piss on his grave.”
• About the head scarf: “Invented by retarded mediaeval goat fuckers who restrict our liberties.”
• He called a gay man a “slobbering chocolate knight” and women were referred to as ‘slits’ or ‘boxes’.
• Van Gogh brushed aside recent threats: “They came from extremist islamic circles. It only shows how pathetic the level of civilisation is in some circles. I am not going to be silenced by those kinds of people.”
• About Holland: “I really hope I may live to be 87 here and that I can empty the cup of wrath to the bottom. But to say that I am looking forward to live in a country that is burdened down by the censorship of political correctness and where the goat fuckers are in power: no, not at all.”
• “I don’t believe in the goodness of human beings, but I do believe in my own arrogance. This is so magic that the bullet will not come for me; at least that’s what I think. I suppose they think ‘he is the village idiot, why shoot him? If it happens, it happens’,” he said in an interview with the RVU.

Submission as bone of contention The film Submission, which Hirsi Ali made with Theo van Gogh, was a bone of contention for many muslims, and not only for them. In the newspaper Trouw [30.8.04] Ton Crijnen wrote that Hirsi Ali was on the warpath again and that her ‘shocking provocation’ would lead her nowhere. “The film of twelve minutes deals in an unprecedented provocative and blasphemous way with the most holy part of their religion: texts from the koran. They are shown on the back of a partly undressed girl. And a woman, ‘dressed’ in a transparent, revealing nkaab, exposes the female hostility of the Holy Book.” In this way Hirsi Ali tried to “expose the cruelty of islam against women.” But the question was for whom she actually did this. Betsy Udink (author and Trouw columnist) warned her: “You will get into trouble.” Hirsi Ali suspected that “the whole muslim world would jump on her.” Muslims are strongly attached to the holy tradition of the koran. They identify the koran with everything that is religiously valuable and emotionally rich. There is no room for a sense of perspective, mockery or obscene language. Muslims fiercely defend the holiness of God’s word as it is incorporated in the koran. Attempts to discredit the holiness of koran verses are regarded as attacks on islam. Although many muslims in the Netherlands have learnt to put many things in perspective, this certainly does not apply to matters concerning their own religion. “There is every reason to expose violence against women in islamic circles, both in the Netherlands and outside, and to start a critical dialogue with muslims on this subject.” Yet, Ton Crijnen fears that the way this has happened in Submission only leads to “muslims putting the wagons in a circle, plugging up their ears and allowing little room for self-criticism. Especially because the chastisement comes from two persons (one of whom is an ‘apostate’) who, due to their absurd statements in the recent past —Hirsi Ali: “Mohammed is perverse”; Van Gogh: “muslims are goat fuckers”— had very little credit left. Of course, art is autonomous, should provoke and explore bounds, but if one wants to communicate a message one should also keep the elasticity of the target group in mind. Most muslims see desecration-in-name-of-freedom-of-speech, as committed by the duo Hirsi Ali-Van Gogh, as the umpteenth proof of western contempt for the islam. This contempt has its roots in the time of the Crusades and has known a long and persistent history since. In muslim eyes our time shows a new revival of anti-islamicism.” By means of Submission Hirsi Ali tried to release muslims and especially muslim women from their oppressive religion. She hasn’t been very successful in this. Even with muslim women in women’s refuge centres the film evoked nothing but disgust. As a conviction politician Hirsi Ali commutes between two conflicting goals. On the one hand she, being an atheist, tries to dissuade muslims from their religion. On the other hand she wants to convert muslims to a liberal version of their religion. Ronald Plasterk rightly pointed out that the effect of her political performance is slight —if not counter-productive—, precisely because her story is not consistent [Volkskrant 3.12.04]. In spite of her militant atheism she admits not being against islam as such. And in spite of her attempts to lead muslims to a more tolerant version of their religion, she emphasises that a liberal European islam is not possible. “There is only one islam.” And that is precisely what fundamentalist and orthodox islamists claim. Her cooperation with Theo van Gogh, who insulted all muslims determinedly and rudely, did result in a provocative and most talked-about film. But it hasn’t increased her chances of convincing muslims and muslim women. If it is her goal to improve the position of muslim women, she has completely overreached herself with Submission.

The books of condolence on the internet were flooded with racist reactions immediately after the murder of Van Gogh. Ranging from “Pim was right, islam is a rotten culture!!” via “Throw those stinking muslims out of the country” to “Muslims are cunts, muslims suck. Muslims must die.” Nearly 3500 messages were deleted from Condoleance.nl, and yet the site was still full of racist language.

On condoleanceregister.com extremist reactions were numerous as well. Sometimes the tone is even relatively moderate.

“It’s a pity that a Dutchman cannot stand up for his own fatherland anymore. We should take firmer measures against the kind of people that do not agree with our society. Holland, change something and stand up for your country” [rene p].

“Jesus flatten all those mosques and BURN all those KORANS. They are millions of years behind …. Religion is the greatest danger there is. And people who believe in the Koran are even completely retarded. STUPID GOATFUCKERS FUCK OFF TO MOROCCO” [johnny p].

“PRAISE THE MARTYR WHO SHOT DOWN VAN GOGH!!! THAT’S HOW THE ZIONISTS AND THEIR SERVANTS COME TO THEIR BLOODY END!” [Schietmijmaarlek (Shootmedown)].

“With the cowardly murder of Theo van Gogh proof has been produced for the umpteenth time that especially the pukelims have to fuck off” [White Paradise].

“Good for you. Go on and play with fire. You want war. You will get war” [ali chemicali].

It was no coincidence that so many right-extremist statements could be read in the online books of condolence. The murder was committed by a Moroccan/Dutch man who legitimised his deed with islamic-fundamentalist texts. This led, for many autochthonous Dutch people, to a revival of an exclusively national sentiment towards foreigners with strange customs and religions. These spontaneous emotional reactions to the murder of Van Gogh were, however, purposefully stimulated and radicalised by racist, ethnocentric, nationalistic and ‘fortuynist’ political powers. Extreme nationalistic and racist sites invoked people to sign the books of condolence. The murder of Van Gogh was seized as an opportunity to explain to the alarmed citizens that draconian measures had to be taken immediately.

Also on the site Volkomenkut [Completelyshit] the bigmouths determine the tone. “Islam forbidden religion and shut all mosques” [peut] is still moderate. “Asshole islam, all back to their own country and a little atom bomb over it” [cnn]. But more cruelty is still to come. “Time for a second Hitler and this time the muslims gassed and more than 6 million! Reopen Auschwitz, now!” [Joop]. Of course ‘the left’ has done it again. “First Pim, now Theo! The blood of the lefties will flow through the streets [perenprak]. The murder of Van Gogh is even used as a good example: “Use the muslims as a model, cut the lefties’ heads off” [dehavenkroe]. In between all this verbal violence you hardly notice that sometimes also opposite contributions are published. Such as this one: “Christian, Jew or Islamite. You simply don’t kill people” [w].

From cyberjihad to political murder

Internet as a platform for violent jihad

357hosting.com In the radio 1 broadcast of 1opdemiddag (Dutch radio programme) at 2 o’clock on Monday (8 November 2004) 357hosting.com was depicted as the largest terrorists host in the world, offering accommodation to thousands of extremist and fundamentalist sites. “The Netherlands is one of the largest home bases of extreme Islamic websites in the world.” Ghaazi of 357hosting was angry with VolkomenKut, Netwerk (Dutch TV programme) and 1opdemiddag. Planet Multimedia and Netkwesties, by the way, had drawn attention to 357hosting before.     357hosting is a one-man company specialised in the anonymous hosting of extremist muslim sites. Since it offers large discounts to islamic sites, it is suspected that the company is financed by wealthy fundamentalists. The company in Nieuwegein had been discredited before, because the American Simon Wiesenthal Institute demanded from the Dutch government that the sites be closed immediately. The main target was the site Hamasonline.com, the site of the Palestinian liberation/terrorist organisation, appearing on the list of terrorist organisations drawn up by the European Union [EU groups and people, non-EU groups and people]. The Public Prosecution stated they would not come into action until a crime was reported, so that the case could be dealt with via criminal law. They saw no other procedure to close the websites of 357hosting. In May 2005 the Public Prosecution started an inquiry into 357hosting, at the request of the Swiss authorities.     Following the commotion around 357hosting the company changed hands in 2005. The ex-manager transferred his business to someone from Jordan.

Mohammed B. and his friends made intensive use of the internet to shape and propagate their views. They operated in several discussion forums and made their own web pages. They had their own web pages for jihad fighters — often with MSN groups, for example under the name of ‘5434’ and ‘twaheedwljihad’). Most of these websites have been removed from the internet by now. Via these sites and their satellites we gain insight in their vision on the cyberjihad in the world and in the Netherlands.

This is their vision on the future of world peace:

”Jihad and Jihad alone saves our countries, frees the people and ultimately leads to true peace.”

Bilal L.: islamic terror via internet

Aboe Qataadah —locked up since 5 November 2004 under his detention name Bilal L.— is part of the circle of friends of Mohammed B. He had been active before in MSN-groups under the names: Al-Ansar, Shareeah, A Salafoe Saali7 and 9113. He was a regular visitor on sites as Marokko.nl and Maroc.nl (example of the difference between a Kaafir and a Muslim), and was frequently excluded (banned). He published a list of addresses of flying schools and shooting clubs and gave advice on books that could be ordered at the El Tawheed mosque.

It attracted the attention of other people as well. On 10 March, for example, Chin_Tok mentioned the Dutch jihad-sites on the VPRO-forum Tegenlicht. He mused: “I am curious to know when the AIVD is going to take action.” On 19 February 2004 Chin_Tok had already drawn attention to the Dutch jihad-site groups.msn.com/shareeah. “I think you are still asleep.” And referring to groups.msn.com/5434 he remarks in the forum of Twee-Vandaag [31.3.04]: “Look what I’ve found. Am curious to know when the AIVD will show up. I think it is only a matter of time before there is an attack in NL.”

Aboe Qataadah (19) is an ideologist who propagated his radical-religious message on other forums as well. He is also active on islaam.nl [see overview] and on marrokko.nl [overviews: (1), (2), (3)]. His message is clear: “It really is good to encourage the young for the Jihad. For only Jihad can save these Ummah and nothing else. But first we have to invite them to TAWHEED. And this counts for us all” [2.5.04].

Aboe Qataadah is not a religious softy, but knows how to use abusive language: “And you are a part of that misery. Doing your best to report your brothers and sisters to the AIVD and give information to for example jongrechts.nl [right-wing site for young people] those grandchildren of monkeys and pigs.” Here he suggests knowledge of leaked-out AIVD-reports.

In the same tough language he reacts to someone who disapproves of the mujahedin murders: “Who are you to criticise Mujahidin from your lazy chair? You are nothing but a cockroach spitting out dirt.”

“I ask Allah the Sublime to deal with the enemies of the Mujahidin.”

Just for a short while it seems as if Aboe Qataadah still finds it hard to come to moral terms with the killing of innocent women and children. “And later I will come back to this about the kidnapping what the Sharia says about killing women and children when they kill our women and children.” But it is remarkable how quickly he is cured of these moral objections: killing women and children is morally justified, because the ‘Westerners’ also kill women and children.

In the MSN-group tawheedwljihad Aboe Qataadah answers the question whether he who abuses the prophet should be killed. His answer is clear: “It is an obligation to kill he who abuses the Prophet whether he is Muslim or Kaafir. And Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh, these pigs who have abused the prophet their punishment is death and their day will come with Allah’s will..!” Even the scholars agree on this, according to Aboe Qataadah. After a small parade of all this ‘scholarship’ he ends by: “May Allah deal with the enemies of Islam …. Ameen.” The text he quotes, Verplichting van het doden van degene die de profeet uitscheld (Obligation to kill those who revile the prophet), is a collage of passages from a 14th century document, translated by Mohammed B. on 2 July 2004.

On the MSN website Jama’at Al-Tawheed Wal Jihaad (by now removed) Aboe Qataadah makes his threats more specific: “Those who combat Muslims or support the combat of Muslims in any way are regarded as one joint enemy. And unfortunately the Netherlands hasn’t learnt anything from the blessed attacks in Madrid …. We Muslims accept no humiliation!!... And geert wilders and hirsi ali and the NL-government, the Mujahidin are on their way. Oh, Allaah, let our death resurrect the Ummah again…Ameen.”

Ambassador of al-Qaeda in Europe Bilal L. borrowed his ‘nom de guerre’ from the islamic clergyman Abu Qata, the ambassador of al-Qaeda in Europe. Although he denies that he has anything to do with Bin Laden [CNN], he is considered to be one of the most dangerous islamic terrorists. Qatada —also known as Sheikh Abu Omar or Omar Mohammed Othman— is a Palestinian who was born in Jordan and who was granted asylum in England in 1994. According to the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzónis he is “the spiritual leader of the mujahedin in England.” Qatada keeps in close contact with terrorist suspects in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and Spain. Many terrorists seem to dispose of his writings.     In 1999 he openly offered his services to Bin Laden. Abu Qatada is one of the 12 foreign terrorist suspects, who have been detained without trial since 2002 in the Belmarsh prison in London, called Guantánamo-on-Thames. In May 2005 he was released and he still lives in England. He is still regarded as the ideological leader of al-Qaeda in Europe. His lectures are not only published on his own website, but are distributed across a widely branched network of English and Arabic internet forums.

The only thing that had to be practically organised was finding a perpetrator, a radical islamic believer who was willing to carry out the deed, which was desired and blessed by Allah. The suggestion was made that there are several people who are willing to lay down their lives for this honourable task. Who would be the one chosen to die with this honour, however, cannot be discussed in the limelight of the internet. It was not wise to disseminate operational information openly via internet.

“There are certain countries in which one can attend a complete Jihad training. However, we are not in the position to supply you with information on this. You could contact people you can trust and who know more about this subject.”

The future martyr, who should still doubt the value of his self-sacrifice, was not only tempted with the 11 imaginary blessings of the martyr. His fate was also relieved by a clear material advantage. The ‘Mujahideen Council of Commanders’ announces an important decision:

“We have decided to help each family of a martyr with a financial amount of $ 1,000.”

The identity of Aboe Qataadah came to light through three anonymous e-mails sent to the National Investigation Service by the aforementioned Chin-Tok (or Chin Tok3). The informer was “a concerned muslim”. In his first e-mail of 14 September 2004 he warns against a group of terrorists in Amsterdam East who were out for the Red Light District.

“Good day, there are some terrorists in Amsterdam East I personally know and they have approached me to carry out attacks in the Netherlands. (…) Their target would be the Red Light District in Amsterdam and the Lower Chamber.”

“I cannot say anything anymore, because I’m afraid. The only thing I want is that you catch them. For they spread a lot of discord here, recruit boys of their own age with video tapes and audios. Thanks in advance.”

Bilal had ‘forgotten’ that as Aboe Qataadah he had systematically preached violent jihad for months, that he had written instructions for taking shooting classes, and that he had explained in detail on every site he got access to why anyone who insulted the prophet had to be killed. Bilal L.’s lawyer compared his client’s behaviour to England’s Prince Harry’s, who put on a Nazi uniform for fun. Bilal L. would have been a bit naïve and unable to judge the scope of his death threat. The public prosecutor himself was of the opinion that the demanded punishment would have a preventative effect. It is to be hoped that he is shown to be right, but this doesn’t seem very likely.

Bilal’s lawyer reduced the systematic propaganda of his client for the terrorist jihad to pub-chat: “Threatening on the internet is like threatening with violence in a pub.” But the judge pointed out that the MSN-group was accessible to anyone and that threats aimed at politicians attract a lot of attention from the media. So Bilal could have known that his words would have a great effect. Threatening to decapitate a member of the house of representatives (as a punishment for mocking islam) was, according to the judge, done “with a terrorist purpose.” On 25 February 2005 Bilal was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment, of which six suspended, and probation for two years. On 5 March 2005 Bilal was set free again. It is to be hoped that he has learnt his lesson and that his remarkable career as Aboe Qataadah is finished, but this again doesn’t seem very likely.

“I will not deny it. I am interested in the jihad. But eight months ago I wasn’t religious at all. I know very little about islam. Someone mailed me: ‘If you consider yourself a muslim, read this, and read that.’ And he sent me videos of the events in the Middle East and some books. I don’t know who that person is. I get this sort of thing a lot on the internet.”

“Not until now do I understand that Geert Wilders only wants to deal with the extremists among the muslims. And I hear from the prison imam that as a muslim I have to stick to democracy. No imam in Amsterdam could tell me this. They weren’t interested in my questions. I only got answers on the internet.”

We will continue.... Bilal L. wouldn’t enjoy his freedom for long. On Thursday 24 March he was arrested again in his house in Amsterdam on suspicion of conspiracy to commit a terrorist crime. Even from his cell he recruited for the armed jihad and inquired after explosives here and there. Aboe Qatadaah has never left Bilal. L. Together they have hoaxed the Dutch legal system and together they can continue their holy war.

Omar A. alias Abu Nawwaar el Hossaymi points out the target

Yehya K. Mohammed B. and Samir A. have turned Holland upside down. There was a lot less attention for Yehya K. (17). On 27 September 2004 this student from Sas van Gent was arrested, because he had threatened Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Geert Wilders to death on internet. The police discovered components for a bomb in his house. Just like other terrorist suspects he meets the profile of people who are sensitive to recruitment for the jihad, as sketched by the AIVD: young, of Moroccan descent and well-educated. According to his school Yehya was a fine student and a nice boy. Yet, he was sensitive to the arguments of muslim extremists who —also or primarily— came in contact with him via internet.

The AIVD established that an increasing number of young muslims feel rebuffed by Dutch society and have too little perspective. Young persons of Moroccan descent are more troubled by this than others. They are stuck between the traditional home front and the modern, secular and individualised society. Quite often a less strict social control applies to Moroccan boys than to boys from other ethnic groups. This makes these relatively well-educated but heavily frustrated young men susceptible to the temptations and promises of fundamentalist preachers and terrorist recruiters (who praise violence as a means to revenge the many humiliations muslims have suffered due to the West). Because of their not particularly bright future a devoted and militant philosophy of life seems to be a tempting alternative. This is how they ripen for recruitment to the jihad. “A network of extremist muslims recruits islamic youngsters in the Netherlands and mentally prepares a small group for violent battle” [AIVD 2002]. They are capable of using so much pressure, that the youngsters cannot resist it anymore.

A growing number of signals confirmed the AIVD’s diagnosis. They became alarming when the Hofstadgroup was taking shape, and started to manifest itself on internet.

After the film Submission was shown on TV, Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh were threatened in the limelight of the internet. This occurred in more places, but for good reasons the MSN-group Muwahhidin/dewaremoslims (thetruemuslims) attracted the attention of the intelligence service. On 30 August ‘Abu Nawwaar el Hossaymi’ published a message saying that the ‘El Muwahhidin brigade’ had succeeded, after ‘a long search’, in tracing the secret address of the ‘disbelieving diabolic’ renegade Hirsi Ali (with picture). This attracted great alarm: the address turned out to be correct. The National Criminal Investigation Department of the KLPD raised the alarm [source]. It was suspected that jihad-militants had closely observed Hirsi Ali’s movements. This wasn’t a threat from a keyboard-terrorist; there was someone who had the motivation and information to actually threaten Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s life. In a second message Abu Nawwaar wrote: “Death will catch up with her.”

Abu Nawwaar on ErTaN On 3 September 2003 the name Abu Nawwaar also appears on the weblog ErTaN. On this site of Ertan Kiliç Abu Nawwaar promises that the ’ Renegade Ayaan’ will be killed anyhow and that she will never be able to evade the revenge of the Muwahhidien Brigade.

However, the first message of ‘Abu Nawwaar’ contained another target: “the disbelieving diabolic mocker Theo van Gogh.” His picture was added as well, with the simple by-line: “Address unknown.” The KLPD reports this to the regional police force, but saw no reason in it to protect Theo van Gogh. On 13 September 2004 the AIVD brought their threat-assessment of Hirsi Ali up to date, after a phoned request by the Unit Surveillance and Security [Eenheid Bewaking en Beveiliging] on 3 September 2004. There was only a marginal reference to the threats against Van Gogh.

“Especially on the internet individual expressions of verbal aggression against Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh can be found as well, apart from an appeal to ignore the film. The AIVD does not exclude that these impulsive thoughts could lead to spontaneous actions. At the moment the AIVD doesn’t have indications that muslims men and women —not to be labelled as radical by the AIVD— will actually perform these emotionally based actions. Actions, arising from and driven by emotions are seldom steered by any degree of planning. Hirsi Ali is valued as ‘medium to high’ and probably ‘high’. High applies to the short period immediately after publication. No value is given to Van Gogh and what happened gave no reason to take further actions directed at spontaneous verbal aggression” [Reconstruction of facts].

Yet, these events on internet were enough reason for the Dutch judiciary to intervene. First the IP-addresses of ‘Abu Nawwaar’ were retrieved from Microsoft in the USA. With the help of this information three different addresses in The Hague were raided. Only the third raid was successful, although the suspect wasn’t there. When the 22-year old Moroccan Omar A. heard from his parents that detectives had taken possession of his computer during a search, he voluntarily reported to the police. ‘Abu Nawwaar’ was exposed, traced down, arrested and indicted. And he turned out to be no small fish.

Abu Nawwaar in NRC Already on 4 September 2004 Jutta Chorus and Steven Derix published an extensive description of the MSN-site MuwahhidinDeWareMoslims. They wonder how seriously such al-Qaeda propaganda-sites should be taken. “Abu Nawwaar and his friends don’t write a lot themselves, but collect a lot of material from several radical islamic sites. Their solemn ‘islamic’ language makes an awkward impression. Most striking is that they make ample use of English material — mainly from Abu Hamza al Misri, the one-handed radical imam, who is detained in a British cell, awaiting his extradition to the US” [NRC, 4.9.04]. However, the site was not only a meeting place for Osama bin Laden fans, and it also was more than an aggressive flirtation with political, violent islam. The MSN-site(s) are mainly used to advocate the topicality of the violent jihad in the Netherlands and to point out targets.

As from 1 July 2004 Omar A. had posted messages in the MSN-group Muwahhidin/dewaremoslims. As the ‘assistant-administrator’ of the group he translated jihad-texts —including a statement of al-Qaeda— from Arabic into Dutch and put them on the forum. After the presentation of the film Submission on 29 August Omar A. couldn’t control his anger anymore. Hirsi Ali had especially “hurt him” with the koran texts that were written in calligraphy on the half-naked body of a veiled supernumerary. “This can’t be done. These are the words of the creator.” In order to express this anger he not only wrote that the ‘Muwahhidin-brigade’ was ready to kill Hirsi Ali, but also revealed her secret address next to the Israeli embassy in The Hague. Motive and means were present; the occasion had to be prevented. Therefore this threat was taken very seriously by the Royal and Diplomatic Protection Service (Dienst Koninklijke en Diplomatieke Beveiliging — DKDB). With due speed Hirsi Ali was transferred to a building of the DKDB which was permanently guarded (‘a safe house’).

The Public Prosecution took the case extremely seriously and mobilised 22 detectives of the Terrorism Unit and Special Tasks (Unit Terrorismebestrijding en Bijzondere Taken — UTBT) to recover Abu Nawwaar’s identity. They were successful. Omar A. was arrested, charged and tried. In his closing speech the public prosecutor said that tracing down Omar was a case of ‘national interest’. The Public Prosecution wanted to put a stop to the growing number of threats and attacks on politicians. The combination of the threat and publication of the secret address of Hirsi Ali were considered as “an encouragement to a serious criminal fact.” On 26 October 2004 the judge sentenced Omar A. to nine months imprisonment, of which three were on probation.

Omar A. declared to the magistrate that he regrets his death threats, but mainly because of the consequences for himself. He took a free Arabic course in the Middle East. He realised he could say good-bye to the second term of his course in Syria now. “Then my studies are ruined” [NRC 27 October 2004]. Omar A. is disappointed in Dutch society and wants to leave the Netherlands as soon as he is released.

By tracing and convicting Omar A. the AIVD, police and prosecution were on a trail which would reveal itself only later. According to a spokesman of the national office of the public prosecutor the investigation of Omar A. had not shown that he maintained ties with members of the Hofstadgroup.

Rifo79 on the warpath

After the murder of Theo van Gogh journalists and other interested citizens went to look for the perpetrator’s identity. The internet forums were full of speculations. Who was this Mohammed B. and under which pseudonym(s) did he operate on internet? The breakthrough didn’t seem to come from the internet, but from conventional and reliable media.

Two weeks after the murder [16.11.04] Radio 1 News announced with great certainty that already since 27 March 2004 Mohammed B. had been a member of the forum marokko.nl, under the username ‘Rifo79’. The editors based this scoop on information from the police file. The Public Prosecution also suspected that Mohammed B. used this name. Besides, the site manager confirmed that all messages of Rifo79 were removed by order of the police.

A dramatic image, stirring the imagination. Mohammed B. would have discussed islam on the internet until shortly before his deed. On Tuesday 2 November, the day of the murder, he would have posted a message at half past twelve at night in a discussion on jews.

Those who had the chance to read which messages Rifo79 put on the forum of marokko.nl, could hardly escape the impression that here at least a keyboard terrorist was speaking. In the months preceding the murder Rifo79 posted 266 contributions on various subjects. His contributions became fiercer and fiercer, in tone and content.

• His early messages are still quite composed. He sticks up for the authors of the rap against member of parliament Hirsi Ali. From October on his reactions become more vehement.
• After the raid in October in the house of a Moroccan family in the Bucheliusstraat in Utrecht Rifo79 writes to a pro-American contributor: “The more innocent muslims are caught the better, only then will they realise how nazi-like your kind is.”
• His contributions continuously degenerate into floods of abuse. A forum participant who writes that abuse was not allowed was given a rocket: “As long as you share your bed with a ‘kaffer’ (disbeliever) and your name isn’t Islamic, you can yell as much as you want, but this still doesn’t make you a muslim.”
• In the last days before the murder Rifo79 posted more than one hundred messages. In a discussion on foreign muslims fighting on the side of the rebels in Iraq, he reacts to someone who calls them scum: “They are coming to do your brothers and that fat pig Allawie in. And what you call scum I call men with balls, not like those little poofs who attack from Apaches and F16s.”
• A forum participant asks Rifo79 why he doesn’t take action when it angers him so much. He replies: “That is secret information, not intended for little pigs like you.”
• On the evening of 1 November through the first half hour of the next day Rifo79 posts 32 messages on the site. One of those was about western soldiers in Iraq. “I really hope they each come back as roast piglets. Without their shitty heads of course.”
• The last message was dated 2 November, half past twelve in the morning, little over eight hours before the murder. Rifo79 reacts to a contribution of ‘Kifaya’, who writes that, according to the koran, you cannot hold all jews responsible for what happens in Israel. Moslima Asma contradicts him: “It even says in the Koran that we cannot retort this. “Do you think you know more than Allah”? Kifaya answers: “Well, this is really sad. Hopefully you have read or understood it the wrong way.” Rifo79 reacts again to this: “If someone is sad it’s you. It is clearly written in the Koran.”

The fact that Rifo79 was still active on Marokko.nl on Friday 12 November cast the first doubt on the scoop of Radio 1 News. It was hardly probable that after his arrest Mohammed B. would still gain access to the internet or that intelligence services would have used the name Rifo79. Moreover, the date of birth in Rifo79’s profile [6-7-78] didn’t match the date of birth of Mohammed B. [8-3-78]. Those who knew Mohammed B. better also saw that the command of language and style of writing were noticeably below his level.

It turned out to be a huge mistake: Rifo79 was not a pseudonym of Mohammed B. A few days after Van Gogh’s murder the computer of the real Rifo79 was confiscated by an ‘army’ of policemen [Spits 18.11.04]. And on Wednesday evening 16 November Rifo79 appeared on marokko.nl to complain indignantly:

“How did they get the idea that I am Mohammed B., from where do they get this information FROM. Is this the media from where we have to get our news, if that is true it is deeply and deeply sad. Accusing people for nothing because they happen to be a too intelligent to discuss with about everything and nothing. Sad…” [20:54].

“We are hunts down both by the media and the aivd. If some nazi vents his bile, and we spit back we are immediately suspects. […] What do they think that we but have put up with, I keep giving my opinions that is my good right. And if I do this, I shouldn’t be compared with some murderer. But all right … this far the intelligence of the average Dutchman don’t reach.”

Some forum participants support him in his demand; others think he should stop whining, because he is only a ‘keyboard terrorist’, who doesn’t put his spiteful words into action.

“You may not be Mohammed Bouyeri, but considering the content of your messages you could have been him. You deserve to be marked as a persona non grata and to be kicked out of the Netherlands” [viergho].

One nick for two persons? It is certainly not impossible that two persons make use of the same pseudonym. Also in the forum of marokko.nl this possibility was pointed out: “If I make a nick and the matching password and pass on the password of the e-mail address behind it to for instance Piglet, Piglet and I can post under one nick and nobody can see that the two of us are active” [viergho].

Radio 1 News, however, refused to rectify her coverage. The chief editors maintained that Mohammed B. left messages behind on the forum of marokko.nl as Rifo79. According to the police Mohammed B. e-mailed from the same IP address. A spokesman of the Public Prosecution in Amsterdam stated that there wasn’t any certainty that Mohammed B. hid behind this pseudonym. It was still assumed, but had to be investigated further.

Rifo79 indeed had the same first name as the murderer of Van Gogh, but he declared that he didn’t even know Mohammed B. Speculations kept doing the rounds. They might both make use of the same pseudonym, or perhaps even the AIVD would use the pseudonym, in order to catch scoundrels in an inscrutably intelligent way by using names of scoundrels.

On Tuesday night 16 November Rifo79’s messages were made accessible again by the administrators of marokko.nl. They concluded that there was nothing wrong with Rifo’s messages and only removed some because they were taken “out of context” [source: ANP].

All commotion about the internet-identity of Mohammed B. was made much of in the press. The internet played a crucial role in the cause of and consequences of this political murder. Controversies in the internet world had immediate repercussions on what happened in society.

But if Rifo79 wasn’t the pseudonym of the real killer, under which usernames or pseudonyms had Mohammed B. operated on internet? Which keyboard terrorist was hiding behind the pseudonym Rifo79? And how many of these potential terrorists make coexisting unsafe by spreading backward, resentful and violence-inciting texts, images and slogans on internet?

Mohammed Bouyeri alias Abu Zubair

The AIVD found the trail of the Hofstadgroup. They knew that “a number of members of the group are active on the internet”. Yet, according to a leaked-out progress report, the intelligence service still conducted no ‘systematic investigation’ into these cyber-terrorist activities in the summer of 2004. Had this been done, they would have discovered that there were internet sites that were directly or indirectly managed by one of the members of the Hofstadgroup. They would also have noticed that in the summer of 2004 texts of ‘Abu Zubair’ were posted in the MSN-group Muwahhidin/dewaremoslims.

The AIVD didn’t fail to notice that potentially radical islamic terrorists made intensive use of internet, but they didn’t see that these and subsequent sites were an important instrument in the construction of the Hofstadgroup. The members of this network used internet to express their process of radicalisation, to convince others —imperatively pedantic— of the blessings of the holy jihad, in order to cultivate the group feeling of the chosen ones, and to give themselves a political identity. The group was driven by totalitarian ideas, which they wanted to sell all too anxiously. The time was ripe for jihad, here and now and with terrorist violence. For the dissemination of this message they made ample use of the possibilities to articulate their islamic dogmatism and radicalisation via internet. The AIVD also didn’t fail to notice that in the period between 18 and 22 September Mohammed B. participates “in discussions on internet about the use of fertiliser as a basis for explosives and the way such bombs can be made” [Reconstruction of facts]. The AIVD was not ready yet to link the information gathered from the local world with traditional means in a systematic and inventive way to information that can be obtained from the virtual world with high-tech means.

That internet has become increasingly important in the dissemination of radical islamic thoughts and sentiments has become a cliché by now. How they use internet is a lot less clear. Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists do not operate in formally and rigidly organised groups, but rather behave like swarms of bees, capable of stinging from all directions. Due to their social discrimination and psychologically experienced lack of power they pursue a swarm-strategy, allowing them to attack a powerful enemy from all directions at the same time. They operate with ‘swords of the weak’. And due to its low costs of access, its speed and worldwide scope, internet has become the largest megaphone in the world. Besides, it is a public space where you can say what you want, without anybody noticing immediately who you really are. After all it doesn’t take lon